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We propose a model of “choice overload,” which refers to a stronger tendency to
select the default option in larger choice problems. Our main finding is a be-
havioral characterization of an asymmetric regret representation that depicts a
decision maker who does not consider the possibility of experiencing regret for
choosing the default option. By contrast, the value of ordinary alternatives is sub-
ject to regret. The calculus of regret for ordinary alternatives is identical to that in
Sarver’s (2008) anticipated regret model, despite the fact that the primitives of the
two theories are different. Our model can also be applied to choice problems with
the option to defer the decision.
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1. Introduction
Choice overload, also known as overchoice, refers to a stronger tendency to stick to the
default option in choice problems that contain many alternatives, where the default op-
tion is the alternative that obtains if the decision maker (DM) does not actively select any
other alternative. Once we depart from the “rational agent” paradigm, one can think of
several reasons for choice overload. In particular, some researchers suggest that, absent
a well defined ranking of alternatives, the DM may regret choosing any given alternative
upon learning more about her tastes (or alternatives), and that the likelihood of expe-
riencing regret may increase with the size of the choice set (Iyengar and Lepper 2000,
Anderson 2003, Inbar et al. 2011).
In practice, regret, or anticipation of it, seems to affect people’s behavior asymmet-
rically, with a bias toward the default option, leading to choice overload. For example, in
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a field study, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) find that a small tasting booth in a grocery store
can generate much more sales than a larger one. In the same study, customers report
greater subsequent satisfaction with their selections when the set of options is limited.
In a laboratory experiment with economic incentives, Dean (2008) confirms that larger
choice sets may reinforce subjects’ tendency to select the default option.1
In this paper, we propose a model of choice overload driven by anticipated regret.
Our main finding is a behavioral characterization of an asymmetric regret representa-
tion. The DM (behaves as if she) is uncertain of her tastes at the time of choice. She
anticipates experiencing regret if her choice turns out to be inferior ex post, upon res-
olution of the uncertainty. Thus, an ordinary alternative is evaluated with its expected
utility minus a regret term. In contrast, when evaluating the default option, the DM does
not consider the possibility of experiencing regret, leading to a bias toward the default
option. Moreover, this bias is stronger in larger choice sets because the regret term for
ordinary alternatives increases when additional alternatives become available.
In the remainder of this section, we take a closer look at our representation, followed
by a literature review. We introduce the formal setup in Section 2, while Section 3 is de-
voted to our axioms and representation theorem. In Section 4, we formalize the notion
of choice overload and present some comparative statics exercises. Section 5 relates
our model to Sarver’s (2008) theory of anticipated regret. Finally, in Section 6, we dis-
cuss a dynamic setup where the default option acts as a means of deferring choice. The
Appendix contains the proofs and some further supplementary material.
1.1 Overview of the representation and axioms
We model the DM’s subjective uncertainty with a probability measure μ on a set U of
ex post utility functions. Each element of U , referred to as a state, is an expected utility
function on a space of lotteries, . We think of these lotteries as ordinary alternatives.
The utility of ordinary alternatives is context dependent and includes a negative regret
term. Specifically, Eμ(u(p) − K(maxq∈x u(q) − u(p))) gives the net expected utility of
selecting an alternative p from a set x⊆ , where Eμ stands for the expectation operator
over u ∈ U with respect to the probability measure μ. We view K(maxq∈x u(q) − u(p))
as the ex post regret in state u that the DM anticipates experiencing upon selecting p
from x. Thus, the ex post regret is proportional to the maximum utility that the DM
could have attained if she were not to select p, while the parameter K measures the
strength of regret. So the net expected utility of selecting p from x is the expectation of
utility minus regret, u(p)−K(maxq∈x u(q)− u(p)).
The ex post regret upon selection of a given ordinary alternative p increases with the
size of the choice set that the DM faces. That is, x ⊆ y implies K(maxq∈x u(q)− u(p)) ≤
K(maxq∈y u(q)− u(p)) at any state u. Consequently, the net expected utility of an given
ordinary alternative decreases with the size of the choice set. By contrast, the utility
of the default option is a context independent number, a. Our interpretation of this
1Also, a field study by Redelmeier and Shafir (1995) shows that the presence of similar medications (in-
stead of a single one) might lead physicians to avoid prescribing any medication if their effectiveness is
doubtful.
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pattern is that, when selecting the default option, the DM does not take into account
the possibility of experiencing regret.2
To summarize, our representation describes a choice correspondence such that,
given a set x of ordinary alternatives, the following two statements hold:
(i) The DM selects an element p′ of x if and only if
Eμ
(
u(p′)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p
′)
))
=max
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p)
))
≥ a
(ii) The DM selects the default option if and only if
max
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p)
))
≤ a
Let us now illustrate how this representation can generate choice overload.
Example 1. A grocery store wants to introduce one or more exotic, herbal jams to its
product line. Their supplier provides two options: a rose jam (r) and a hibiscus jam (h).
The store manager will base his decision on the projected behavior of a generic shopper,
who is our DM. The DM is not familiar with either type of jam and she is uncertain of
her tastes. She has two equally likely ex post utility functions, u1 and u2, defined as
u1 u2
r 5 1
h 1 5
The DM’s regret parameter is K = 2, and her default option is not to buy a herbal
jam, which yields the utility level 0.
When there is only one ordinary alternative, the DM does not experience regret ac-
cording to our representation. Thus, if the store offers only one type of a jam, the DM’s
expected utility from that jam will be 5/2 + 1/2 = 3. As 3> 0, the DM will purchase the
offered product in this case.
Alternatively, if the store offers both jams, then purchasing either will induce an ex
post regret of 2(5−1)= 8 with probability 1/2. Thus, in this case, the net expected utility
of a jam will be 3− 8/2 = −1< 0. Consequently, the simultaneous presence of two jams
will cause the DM to refrain from purchasing any. ♦
Behavioral characterization of our representation demands two substantive axioms.
The first one is a general version of the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) that
is confined to instances in which the DM does not select the default option. This axiom
enables our model to accommodate a context dependent attitude toward the default
2The default option is an object that does not belong to . A particular implication of this assumption is
that the default option does not enter the calculus of regret for ordinary alternatives. This seems reasonable
because if the DM were to take into account the possibility of experiencing regret for choosing an ordinary
alternative over the default option, presumably she would also be able to take into account the opposite
scenario, i.e., the possibility of experiencing regret for choosing the default option.
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option, while disciplining the choices among ordinary alternatives. We call this property
exclusive WARP.
The second axiom, called asymmetric alpha, ensures that the context dependence
embodied in the model works in the same direction as the findings on choice overload.
This axiom asserts that if an ordinary alternative p is selected from a given set, then
it should also be selected from any subset that contains p. Since the default option is
present in any choice problem, it follows that the DM has a stronger tendency to select
the default option when she faces a larger choice set.
Apart from these two axioms, we also impose a nontriviality condition and some
independence and continuity properties.
1.2 Related literature
Our definition of regret follows Sarver’s (2008) anticipated regret model, which takes as
primitive a preference relation over menus, i.e., choice sets. Aside from different primi-
tives, the main novelty of the present approach is the asymmetry embodied in our rep-
resentation. Specifically, in our theory, only ordinary alternatives are subject to antici-
pated regret, and this is precisely how we accommodate the findings on choice overload.
By contrast, in Sarver’s theory, anticipated regret influences the value of all alternatives
uniformly, holding fixed the menu that the DM faces. Consequently, the corresponding
choice behavior is compatible with WARP. Despite these differences, Sarver’s representa-
tion theorem plays a key role in the proof of our main result. A more detailed discussion
of the connections between the two theories can be found in Section 5.
The classical regret theory, due to Bell (1982), Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1987), and
Sugden (1993), envisions a DM endowed with a general regret/rejoice functional that
can lead to cyclical choices among any set of alternatives. The predictions of our the-
ory are more disciplined thanks to exclusive WARP, which rules out cycles among ordi-
nary alternatives. Indeed, in our theory, the net expected utility of selecting p from a
given choice set exceeds that of selecting q if and only if Eμ(u(p)) ≥ Eμ(u(q)), which
means that the DM’s choices among ordinary alternatives can also be represented with
the (gross) expected utility function p→Eμ(u(p)).
Minimax regret models (e.g., Hayashi 2008, Stoye 2011) portray a DM who selects
an alternative that minimizes the maximum expected regret, where the maximum is
taken over a set of priors on exogenously given states. In these models, the value of
any alternative, be it a default option or not, includes a regret term, in contrast to the
asymmetry embodied in our model. Moreover, violations of WARP are solely driven by
ambiguity, as opposed to risk, and disappear completely unless the DM holds multiple
priors. On a related note, in our representation, “preference uncertainty” is subjective,
as opposed to the Savagean approach with exogenous states adopted in minimax regret
models.
Apart from his experimental findings, Dean (2008) proposes a theoretical model of
choice overload that focuses on incomplete preferences. His most closely related repre-
sentation depicts, roughly, a DM who selects an ordinary alternative if and only if that
alternative is ranked above any other option according to an incomplete preference re-
lation.
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Gerasimou (forthcoming) provides axiomatic foundations for a choice rule that re-
sembles the one proposed by Dean (2008). While neither of these models admits an
anticipated regret interpretation, Gerasimou’s axioms are closely related to ours.3 In
fact, except for our independence axioms, which have no place in Gerasimou’s ordinal
setup, all of our substantive axioms do hold in the latter model. In particular, the con-
traction consistency axiom of Gerasimou is a direct analogue of our asymmetric alpha,
the only difference being that the empty set, which represents deferral in Gerasimou’s
model, takes the role of the default option in our model.4 Gerasimou also assumes a
variant of WARP, which is stronger than our exclusive WARP. Thus, our findings imply
that in a cardinal setup with suitable independence properties, the incomplete prefer-
ence relation envisioned by Gerasimou (and Dean) can actually be replaced by an ex-
pected utility function p → Eμ(u(p)), as far as the ranking of ordinary alternatives is
concerned. However, this does not mean that our model is more general because an in-
dependence axiom does, indeed, play a role in our derivation of a complete ranking of
ordinary alternatives. (We elaborate on this in Section 3.)
Dean et al. (2017) relate choice overload to limited attention. A key feature of their
model is that if an ordinary alternative p attracts the DM’s attention in a large set, then
it also does so in any subset that contains p. However, the converse does not hold in
general, leading to potential violations of exclusive WARP. Specifically, an ordinary alter-
native p may be selected over another ordinary alternative q in a given set and, yet, the
DM may switch to q in a larger set if p happens to slip her attention.
By holding the default option fixed, in this paper we abstract from the traditional
status quo bias, which refers to an enhanced preference toward an alternative when that
alternative is designated as the status quo. To accommodate this phenomenon, a vari-
ety of reference dependent choice models were proposed, pioneered by Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1979) theory of loss aversion. Typically, the models in this strand of litera-
ture satisfy WARP for a fixed status quo option.5 To the best of our knowledge, the only
exceptions that also accommodate choice overload are the aforementioned papers by
Dean (2008) and Dean et al. (2017).
2. The model
We denote by B a finite set of riskless prizes, while  stands for the set of all lotteries
on B. We equip  with the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖ and the usual algebraic operations. An
ordinary alternative, denoted as pp′ q r, etc., refers to a generic element of . By a
choice set, we mean a nonempty closed subset of . We denote the choice sets as x y z,
etc. In turn, X stands for the collection of all choice sets equipped with the Hausdorff
metric dH .6
3Needless to say, we formulated our axioms independently.
4One of the main differences between Gerasimou (forthcoming) and Dean (2008) is the same: In the
former model, the option to defer the decision replaces the default option. In addition, Gerasimou drops
a secondary decision criterion considered by Dean, and thereby formulates more compactly the idea of
“incomplete preference maximization.”
5Recent contributions of this sort include Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2014), Sagi (2006), Apesteguia and
Ballester (2009), Ortoleva (2010), Riella and Teper (2014), and Ok et al. (2015).
6Specifically, dH(x y) :=max{maxp∈xminq∈y ‖p− q‖maxq∈y minp∈x ‖p− q‖} for every x y ∈X .
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We assume that, in addition to ordinary alternatives, there exists a fixed default op-
tion (or a status quo alternative) that is available in every choice problem. The symbol
 denotes this default option, which is an object that does not belong to . Accordingly,
a choice correspondence c is defined as a nonempty valued correspondence from X into
∪ {} such that, for every x ∈X ,
c(x)⊆ x∪ {}
Following the standard interpretation in choice theory, if an object belongs to c(x), we
understand that the DM in question may select that object in the choice problem x∪{}.
Our representation suggests that the DM is uncertain of her tastes at the time of
choice. We model the DM’s tastes with expected utility functions on . We use the same
notation for an expected utility function and the associated utility vector (or index). That
is, u(p)=∑b∈B ubpb = u ·p.
Set
R
B
0 :=
{
u ∈RB :
∑
b∈B
ub = 0
}
and U := {u ∈RB0 : ‖u‖ = 1}
We view U as a canonical state space because any nonconstant von Neumann–Morgen-
stern preference on  can be represented with a function in U .7 Finally, we write
Eμ(f (u)) in place of
∫
U f (u)μ(du), for a continuous function f : U →R and a (countably
additive, Borel) probability measure μ on U .
The next definition formalizes our representation notion.
Definition 1. An asymmetric regret representation (henceforth, AR representation) for
a choice correspondence c consists of a probability measure μ on U , and a pair of num-
bers K and a, with K ≥ 0, such that the following two statements hold for every x ∈ X
and p′ ∈ x:
(i) We have p′ ∈ c(x) if and only if
Eμ
(
u(p′)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p
′)
))
=max
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p)
))
≥ a
(ii) We have  ∈ c(x) if and only if
max
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p)
))
≤ a
In what follows, (μKa) stands for a generic AR representation.
As we discussed in Section 1.1, the parameter a represents the utility of, which is a
context independent number, while Eμ(u(p)−K(maxq∈x u(q)− u(p))) is the expected
utility of selecting p from x, net of the regret term K(maxq∈x u(q)− u(p)). It should also
be noted that
argmax
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)
)= argmax
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p)
))
∀x ∈X 
7In that respect, we follow Dekel et al. (2001) and Sarver (2008), among many others.
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Thus, if it is nonempty, the set of ordinary alternatives that the DM may select from a
given choice set x coincides with the maximizers of the gross expected utility function
p→Eμ(u(p)) over x.
3. Representation theorem
We now turn to behavioral characterization of AR representations. Our first axiom is a
general version of WARP.
A1 (Exclusive WARP). If x ⊆ y and c(x) c(y) ⊆ , then c(y) ∩ x = ∅ implies c(y) ∩ x =
c(x).
Observe that the scope of this axiom is limited to choice sets x and y such that does
not belong to c(x) or c(y). Thus, exclusive WARP does not impose any restriction on the
DM’s decisions to select, leading to a (possibly) context dependent attitude toward the
default option. By contrast, Arrow’s (1959) classical formulation of WARP applies to any
pair of choice sets x y with x ⊆ y. This is the only difference between exclusive WARP
and Arrow’s formulation.
We complement exclusive WARP with an asymmetric version of Sen’s (1971) prop-
erty alpha.8
A2 (Asymmetric alpha). If x⊆ y, then p ∈ c(y)∩ x implies p ∈ c(x).
Unlike in exclusive WARP, the sets c(y) and c(x) in the statement of asymmetric al-
pha may also contain . In particular, it follows that if an ordinary alternative p ∈ x
is selected over the default option from a set y that contains x, then p should also be
selected from the small set x. However, asymmetrically, we do not demand the same
from the default option. Thus, it remains possible to have c(y) = {} and  /∈ c(x) for
some x y ∈ X with x ⊆ y. Indeed, this is precisely the pattern observed in the findings
on choice overload. By contrast, the classical version of property alpha does not make
such a distinction between the available alternatives.
Our independence axiom consists of three parts, each focusing on a different sce-
nario about the contents of c(x) and c(y), given a pair of sets x and y that will be mixed
with each other. By a mixture of x and y, we mean the set αx+ (1−α)y := {αp+ (1−α)q :
p ∈ xq ∈ y} for some α ∈ [01].
A3 (Independence). (i) If c(x) ∩  = ∅ and c(y) ∩  = ∅, then for every p ∈ x, q ∈ y and
α ∈ (01),
p ∈ c(x) and q ∈ c(y) ⇔ αp+ (1− α)q ∈ c(αx+ (1− α)y)
8“Property alpha” is the term introduced by Sen (1971) to refer to Chernoff’s (1954) Postulate 4. As shown
by Sen, this property and a dual property beta are jointly equivalent to WARP.
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(ii) If c(x)= {} and  ∈ c(y), then c(αx+ (1− α)y)= {} for every α ∈ (01).
(iii) For every pq r ∈  and α ∈ [01],
p ∈ c({pq}) and c({αq+ (1− α)r})∩ =∅ ⇒ c({αp+ (1− α)r})∩ =∅
Part (i) of this axiom is a fairly standard independence property that is satisfied in the
classical model of choice under risk. One notable implication of this part of the axiom is
that if c(x) and c(y) both contain ordinary alternatives, then c(αx+ (1− α)y) must also
contain some ordinary alternatives. Part (ii) is a dual property, which says that if the DM
does not select an ordinary alternative from x and if she also selects  given y, then she
must select  uniquely when she faces αx+ (1 − α)y for any α ∈ (01). As for part (iii),
suppose c({p}) = {p} while c({r}) = {}. Then, given any α ∈ (01), we may well have
c({αp + (1 − α)r}) = {}. However, following the logic of the classical independence
axiom, this possibility can be ruled out if p is revealed preferred to some q such that
αq+ (1− α)r is revealed preferred to . This is the content of part (iii).
Our next axiom is a standard topological continuity property.
A4 (Continuity). Let (xn) be a sequence in X that converges to x.
(i) If pn ∈ c(xn)∩ for every n and pn → p, then p ∈ c(x).
(ii) If  ∈ c(xn) for every n, then  ∈ c(x).
We also require a Lipschitz continuity property, which takes the role of the corre-
sponding axiom of Sarver (2008). This property can be interpreted along the lines of
Dekel et al. (2007).
A5 (L-Continuity). There exist y∗ y∗ ∈X and a numberm> 0 such that for every x y ∈X
and α ∈ (01)with dH(x y)≤ α/m,
 ∈ c(αy∗ + (1− α)y) ⇒  ∈ c(αy∗ + (1− α)x)
Our final axiom is a nontriviality condition.
A6 (Nontriviality). There exist p∗p∗ ∈  such that c({p∗})= {p∗} and c({p∗})= {}.
This axiom rules out the cases in which the default option is the best or worst alter-
native. In terms of an AR representation (μKa), A6 means that
Eμ
(
u(p∗)
)
> a>Eμ
(
u(p∗)
)
for some p∗p∗ ∈  (1)
Throughout the paper, we say that an AR representation is nontrivial if it satisfies (1).
Our main representation theorem reads as follows.
Theorem 1. A choice correspondence c on X satisfies the axioms A1–A6 if and only if it
admits a nontrivial AR representation.
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Toward the proof of Theorem 1, in Appendix B we first establish an auxiliary repre-
sentation (Theorem 0) that dispenses with asymmetric alpha as well as part (iii) of the
independence axiom. Essentially, this auxiliary representation delivers a von Neumann–
Morgenstern preference on  and a continuous, affine9 function  :X →R such that,
for every x ∈X ,
c(x)∩ =∅ ⇒ c(x)∩= {p ∈ x : p q ∀q ∈ x}
c(x)∩ =∅ ⇔ (x)≥ 0 and  ∈ c(x) ⇔ (x)≤ 0 (2)
The first part of this expression means that as far as the ordinary alternatives are
concerned, the DM is a standard preference maximizer. In particular, the relation 
represents the DM’s ranking of ordinary alternatives. However, the ranking of the default
option is context dependent, as depicted in the second part of (2). Specifically, if (x)≥
0, the best ordinary alternatives in x are selected over , whereas the opposite behavior
obtains when (x)≤ 0.
We elicit the DM’s ranking of ordinary alternatives from local choice data, focusing
on a small neighborhood of an ordinary alternative p∗ with c({p∗}) = {p∗}. The role
of exclusive WARP is to ensure that c can be “rationalized” by a preference relation 
in this neighborhood. From part (i) of the independence axiom, it follows that  is a
von Neumann–Morgenstern preference. The very same axiom also implies that  can
be extended to the entire space  (uniquely) in such a way that the first implication in
(2) holds true. In turn, part (ii) of the independence axiom has a significant role in the
derivation of an affine function  that satisfies the second line in expression (2).
The remainder of the proof of Theorem 1 builds on asymmetric alpha and part (iii)
of the independence axiom. Claim 6 in Appendix C shows that part (iii) of the indepen-
dence axiom implies, for any pq ∈ ,
p q ⇔ ({p})≥({q}) (3)
So, the function p → ({p}) represents the DM’s ranking of ordinary alternatives. Fi-
nally, asymmetric alpha helps us show that  can be written as a positive affine trans-
formation of the maximum values that a net expected utility function attains over choice
sets.10 That is, there exist a probability measure μ on U and three numbers K, α, and γ
with K ≥ 0 and α> 0, such that for every x ∈X ,
(x)= αmax
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p)
))
+ γ (4)
From (2), (3), and (4), it easily follows that the parameters μ, K, and a := −γ/α constitute
an AR representation for the choice correspondence c.
9A function  :X →R is affine if (λx+ (1−λ)y)= λ(x)+ (1−λ)(y) for every x y ∈X and λ ∈ (01).
An affine function on  is defined analogously.
10More specifically, this step of the proof follows from Sarver’s (2008) representation theorem, while
asymmetric alpha establishes the main link between the two theories. (More on this in Section 5 below.)
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4. Comparative statics
As we mentioned earlier, choice overload refers to a stronger tendency to select the de-
fault option in larger choice problems. The following definition formalizes this phe-
nomenon.
Definition 2. A choice correspondence c exhibits choice overload at x ∈X if c(x)= {}
and there exists ap ∈ x such thatp ∈ c({p}). We say that c exhibits choice overload if there
exists such an x.
In our model, p ∈ c({p}) means that p is revealed preferred to . According to the
standard choice theory, if  ∈ c(x) for a choice set x and if x contains an alternative p
that is revealed preferred to , then p should also belong to c(x). Thus, the pattern in
Definition 2 can be viewed as a boundedly rational mode of behavior. It is also clear that
this pattern corresponds to a particular form of choice overload in which the presence of
many ordinary alternatives, as opposed to a single one, triggers the choice of the default
option.
In fact, our theory attributes such instances to anticipated regret. To see this point,
let c be a choice correspondence that admits an AR representation (μKa), and set
φ(p) := Eμ
(
u(p)
) ∀p ∈  (5)
Observe that if there is only one ordinary alternative, selecting that alternative does not
inflict regret. That is, with y = {p}, we have maxq∈y u(q)−u(p)= 0 for every u ∈ U . Hence,
the net expected utility of selecting p from {p} is equal to φ(p), which implies
p ∈ c({p}) ⇔ φ(p)≥ a (6)
So, given a choice set x that contains an alternative p with p ∈ c({p}), putting aside
the expected regret terms, the alternative that maximizes φ on x would surely yield an
expected utility that exceeds a. It follows that we can have c(x) = {} only because of
the negative impact of anticipated regret.
Henceforth, the term “choice overload” refers to Definition 2.
Proposition 1. Let c be a choice correspondence that admits a nontrivial AR represen-
tation (μKa). Then c exhibits choice overload if and only if K > 0 and the support of μ
contains at least two distinct points.
Intuitively, Proposition 1 means that the DM exhibits choice overload if and only if
she faces a subjective uncertainty and K > 0 so that this uncertainty leads to instances
of regret. For further insight, suppose μ = δuˆ for some uˆ ∈ U .11 Then the expected re-
gret term KEμ(maxq∈x u(q) − u(p)) is equal to ex post regret at the state uˆ, given by
K(maxq∈x uˆ(q) − uˆ(p)). Moreover, by definition of φ, μ = δuˆ implies φ(p) = uˆ(p) for
every p ∈ . Finally, recall that if it is nonempty, the set c(x)∩ equals argmaxp∈x φ(p).
11Throughout the paper, δu denotes the degenerate probability measure supported at u.
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It follows that if the support of μ contains only one point, then the expected regret term
equals 0 for every x ∈X and any ordinary alternative that the DM may choose from x. In
this case, c admits a standard utility representation, which does not allow choice over-
load. Specifically, we have c(x)= argmaxt∈x∪{} g(t) for every x ∈X , where
g(t) :=
{
φ(t) for t ∈ 
a for t =
Similarly, an AR representation with K = 0 reduces to the standard model above.
Conversely, if K > 0 and the support of μ contains two distinct points, then for any
p ∈  with φ(p)= a, there exists a choice set x containing p such that c exhibits choice
overload at x. In fact, any neighborhood of p contains such an x. We refer to Lemma 1
in Appendix D for the details of this construction, which completes the proof of Propo-
sition 1.
Motivated by Proposition 1, we say that a nontrivial AR representation (μKa) is
strictly nontrivial if K > 0 and the support of μ contains at least two distinct points.
The following definition proposes a comparative measure of choice overload.
Definition 3. Let c and c′ be a pair of choice correspondences. We say that c′ is more
choice overload prone than c if for any x ∈ X , whenever c exhibits choice overload at x,
so does c′.
Clearly, if c does not exhibit choice overload, then any other choice correspondence
is more choice overload prone than c. Hence, we focus on choice correspondences that
exhibit choice overload, i.e., on strictly nontrivial AR representations.
Proposition 2. Let (μKa) and (μ′K′ a′) be strictly nontrivial AR representations for
c and c′, respectively. Assume further that μ = μ′. Then c′ is more choice overload prone
than c if and only ifK′ ≥K and a′ = a.
This result shows that holding fixed the belief μ, the DM’s tendency to exhibit choice
overload can be strengthened by increasing the regret parameter K. Moreover, the utility
of the default option, a, should be kept constant to make sure that the DM’s behavior
does not change in choice problems that contain only one ordinary alternative.
Roughly, Definitions 2 and 3 suggest that if c′ is more choice overload prone than c,
we must have
p ∈ c({p}) ⇒ p ∈ c′({p}) (7)
Indeed, c can exhibit choice overload at x only if p ∈ c({p}) for some p ∈ x, and similarly
for c′. Expression (7) is equivalent to saying that φ(p) ≥ a implies φ′(p) ≥ a′, because
expression (6) also applies to c′, φ′, and a′. Moreover, φ = φ′ assuming μ = μ′. So, it
follows that if c′ is more choice overload prone than c, we must have a≥ a′.
Conversely, the first part of the definition of choice overload, i.e., the condition
c(x)= {}, pushes both a and K in the opposite direction. Following the logic of expres-
sion (7), c′ is more choice overload prone than c only if c(x) = {} implies c′(x) = {}.
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That is, c′ must exhibit a stronger preference for (relative to ordinary alternatives) than
c does. In turn, this effect can be decomposed into two parts. First, the representation
of c′ must attach a larger utility to , so that a′ ≥ a. Second, the net expected utility of
ordinary alternatives should be smaller according to c′ due to a larger expected regret
functional, which means K′ ≥K.
At first sight, one might think that, in the statement of Proposition 2, the assumption
μ = μ′ can be replaced with the weaker condition φ = φ′. However, this contention is
not correct, because the behavior of the expected regret term KEμ(maxq∈x u(q)− u(p))
tightly depends on the probability measure μ. Put differently, even if K′ ≥ K, at least
for some choice sets, the representation (μ′K′ a) may induce smaller expected regret
terms than (μKa) does unless μ and μ′ satisfy certain conditions beyond the assump-
tion φ=φ′. We provide an overview of these conditions in Appendix A.
Our last result highlights the role of the parameter a, in line with the related remarks
on Proposition 2. Holding fixed the net expected utility of ordinary alternatives, an in-
crease in a corresponds to a stronger tendency to select the default option, irrespective
of the choice set that the DM faces.
Proposition 3. Let (μKa) and (μ′K′ a′) be nontrivial AR representations for c and
c′, respectively. Assume further that μ= μ′ andK =K′. Then a≤ a′ if and only if for every
x ∈X ,
c(x)= {} ⇒ c′(x)= {}.
5. Relation to Sarver’s menu-choice model
The primitive of Sarver’s (2008) theory is a preference relation ∗ on the collection of
choice sets, X . His main result delivers a probability measure μ on U and a number K ≥
0 such that the function x→maxp∈x Eμ(u(p)−K(maxq∈x u(q)−u(p))) represents∗. In
the present context, x∗ y should be interpreted as saying that the best ordinary alter-
native in x leads to a higher net expected utility than the best ordinary alternative in y.
In the proof of Theorem 1, we define a binary relation ∗ on X as x∗ y if and only
if (x)≥(y), where  is the function in expression (2). The main behavioral property
demanded by Sarver’s representation theorem is the dominance axiom, which asserts
that
{p}∗ {q} and p ∈ x ⇒ x∗ x∪ {q}
Intuitively, this axiom means that the presence of an ordinary alternative q can only
make the DM worse off unless q is strictly better than any other ordinary alternative that
is available. Our asymmetric alpha has a similar flavor. Letting y := x ∪ {q}, this axiom
can be interpreted as saying that if, given the choice set y, the DM prefers to select an
ordinary alternative p over despite the negative effect of q, then she should also select
p upon removal of q.
Building on asymmetric alpha, Claim 7 in Appendix C shows that the relation ∗
induced by the function  satisfies the dominance axiom, in addition to all other axioms
of Sarver. Then we apply Sarver’s representation theorem to deduce Theorem 1 from our
auxiliary representation.
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To relate the comparative statics of the two models, let ∗ and ′∗ stand for a pair
of preference relations on X . As a comparative measure of “regret aversion,” Sarver pro-
poses the following definition: For every p ∈  and x ∈X ,
{p} ∗ x ⇒ {p} ′∗ x (8)
This means that, compared to ′∗, the relation ∗ is less averse toward choice sets
with multiple elements, which pose the danger of regret. In a sense, property (8) is
stronger than our comparative measure of choice overload because the former applies
to any (px) ∈ × X , whereas our definition focuses on instances with c(x) = {} and
p ∈ c({p}) for some p ∈ x. It is this difference that allows us to conclude that any choice
correspondence is more choice overload prone than another one that does not exhibit
choice overload. By contrast, any pair of preference relations on X must have a non-
trivial relationship whenever they are ranked according to Sarver’s regret aversion.12 Re-
markably, however, for choice correspondences that exhibit choice overload, the para-
metric characterization of our comparative measure is equivalent to that of Sarver,
putting aside the additional parameter a in our model.
Similarly, for choice correspondences that exhibit choice overload, the uniqueness
properties of our representation are identical to those of Sarver’s, aside from straightfor-
ward adjustments necessitated by the presence of the parameter a. It should be noted,
however, that in both models the parameters μ and K can be identified only jointly, but
not separately. In other words, without altering the associated choice correspondence,
one can change K by manipulating μ, and vice versa. While Appendix A contains some
related remarks on the comparative statics of our model, a detailed discussion of the
uniqueness issue can be found in an earlier version of the present paper, Buturak and
Evren (2015).
6. Choice deferral: A “rational” form of choice overload
In many choice problems, the default option acts as a flexible alternative that allows the
DM to defer the decision temporarily. For example, a person who has a certain bud-
get to buy a new TV set may decide to stick to her old TV for a while so as to reflect on
her tastes or the available alternatives. Experimental studies on such choice problems
document the same pattern as in the notion of choice overload: Larger choice sets rein-
force subjects’ tendency to select the default option (Tversky and Shafir 1992, Dhar 1997,
White and Hoffrage 2009).
Under suitable assumptions, our theory can also be applied to such dynamic prob-
lems. The dynamic setting, however, requires a “preference for flexibility” interpretation
along the lines of the menu-choice literature pioneered by Kreps (1979) and Dekel et al.
(2001). Specifically, suppose that the DM faces a choice set x⊆  at a given point of time,
stage 1. She has to select an alternative from x, but she can also postpone this decision
to a later point, stage 2, by selecting the default option  at stage 1. If, however, she se-
lects an ordinary alternative at stage 1, she has to consume it perpetually. Moreover, she
12Indeed, if (8) holds, then {p} ∗ {q} implies {p} ′∗ {q}. So ∗ and ′∗ must agree on the ranking of
singletons.
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is uncertain of her tastes at stage 1 and expects to find out her true preference relation
by the beginning of stage 2.
If we model the DM’s subjective uncertainty with a probability measure μ on U , the
expected lifetime utility of selecting at stage 1 given a choice set x can be formulated as
a+KEμ(maxq∈x u(q)). Here, a represents the utility of consuming  at stage 1, whereas
K ≥ 0 measures the importance of future consumption relative to instantaneous con-
sumption, which may depend on the DM’s time preferences/discount factor as well as
the relative duration of the two stages. The term maxq∈x u(q) is the ex post utility level
that the DM will attain at state u upon deferring choice at stage 1. By the same logic, if we
rule out potential effects of anticipated regret, the expected lifetime utility of selecting
an ordinary alternative p can be expressed as (1+K)Eμ(u(p)).
These specifications lead to a choice correspondence c defined by the following two
statements:
(i) We have p′ ∈ c(x) if and only if
(1+K)Eμ
(
u(p′)
)= (1+K)max
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)
)≥ a+KEμ(max
q∈x u(q)
)

(ii) We have  ∈ c(x) if and only if
(1+K)max
p∈x Eμ
(
u(p)
)≤ a+KEμ(max
q∈x u(q)
)

It can easily be verified that statements (i) and (ii) are equivalent to the correspond-
ing statements in the definition of an AR representation. Thus, axioms A1–A6 also pro-
vide a behavioral foundation for the dynamic representation above. However, this does
not mean that the static and dynamic versions of our theory are conceptually equiva-
lent. In particular, if the default option acts as a means of deferring choice, there seems
to be no reason to interpret the choice overload pattern in Definition 2 as a violation of
WARP. After all, the DM selects the default option not to consume it perpetually, but to
keep her options open temporarily, just as in the aforementioned menu-choice models
on preference for flexibility. In this sense, the pattern in Definition 2 can be viewed as a
rational form of choice overload in dynamic problems with the option to defer choice.
Appendix
Throughout the appendix, we often write maxx u and argmaxx u in place of maxp∈x u(p)
and argmaxp∈x u(p), respectively.
Appendix A: On the role of beliefs in comparative statics
How can we obtain a more choice overload prone AR representation by modifying the
DM’s belief? An earlier version of this paper, Buturak and Evren (2015), provides formal
results that answer this question.13 In this appendix, we summarize the contents of
13In Buturak and Evren (2015), the comparative measure of choice overload is defined in a slightly differ-
ent way, but that definition is equivalent to the present one. We thank a referee for suggesting the present
version of Definition 3.
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these results, which are quite involved. At the outset, it should be noted that any change
in the DM’s belief also necessitates changes in other parameters so as to obtain a new
representation that is more choice overload prone.
Consider a choice correspondence c that admits a nontrivial AR representation
(μKa). The gross expected utility function φ, defined in (5), can equivalently be
thought of as a vector in RB0 . In fact, as a vector, φ is equal to the expectation of the
identity function u → u with respect to μ. That is, φ = (Eμ(ub))b∈B. Hence, we refer to
φ as the mean of μ.
Set uφ := φ/‖φ‖. Given the nontriviality assumption, φ is nonzero, and uφ is a well
defined element of U . Moreover, K(maxq∈x uφ(q)−uφ(p))= 0 for any x ∈X andp ∈ c(x)
since uφ and φ are collinear. In this sense, uφ is a regret-free state.
To clarify the main idea, suppose, for the moment, that we expand our state space
so that every point in RB0 qualifies as a state. As is well known, for any x ∈X , the support
function u → maxx u is convex in u ∈ RB0 (see, e.g., Schneider 1993, Section 1.7). Thus,
replacing a probability measure on RB0 with a mean-preserving spread of that measure
induces larger expected regret terms. Intuitively, this corresponds to an increase in sub-
jective uncertainty, which decreases the net expected utility of ordinary alternatives, just
as in the case of a risk-averse individual who does not like mean-preserving spreads of
monetary lotteries.
Let us now consider an example where the original belief μ is supported over U .
Pick any u¯ in the support of μ that is distinct from the regret-free state uφ and suppose
μ({u¯}) > 0. Let {v1     vn} ⊆RB0 be a finite set that contains u¯ in its convex hull. That is,
let u¯=∑ni=1 αivi for some {α1    αn} ⊆ [01] with ∑ni=1 αi = 1. Then we can construct a
new probability measureμ′ on RB0 by transferring the mass μ({u¯}) to the points v1     vn
so that μ′({vi}) = αiμ({u¯}) for every i. By construction, φ′ and φ, i.e., the means of μ′
and μ, are equal to each other. In fact, μ′ is a mean-preserving spread of μ because
the former probability measure is obtained from the latter by replacing u¯ with multiple
points, v1     vn. Since the support functions are convex, from Jensen’s inequality it
then follows that Eμ′(maxx u)≥Eμ(maxx u) for every x ∈X .14 Moreover, with φ′ =φ, for
any x ∈X and p ∈ x, this implies
Eμ′
(
u(p)−K
(
max
x
u− u(p)
))
=φ′(p)−K
(
Eμ′
(
max
x
u
)
−φ′(p)
)
≤φ(p)−K
(
Eμ
(
max
x
u
)
−φ(p)
)
=Eμ
(
u(p)−K
(
max
x
u− u(p)
))

So replacing μ with the mean-preserving spread μ′ decreases the net expected util-
ity of ordinary alternatives. Consequently, the choice correspondence represented by
(μ′Ka) is more choice overload prone than that represented by (μKa).
14Indeed, Eμ′(maxx u)−Eμ(maxx u)= μ({u¯})(Eη(maxx u)−maxx u¯), where η is the probability measure
on RB0 that attaches the mass α
i to the point vi for i = 1     n. Furthermore, the mean of η equals u¯ by
construction, and, hence, Jensen’s inequality implies Eη(maxx u)≥maxx u¯.
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Adapting this method to the state space U requires further work that also includes
a shift in the regret parameter K. Since the unit ball in RB0 is a strictly convex set, the
given point u¯ cannot be expressed as a convex combination of other states in U . Yet we
can find some states v1     vn ∈ U and weights α1    αn ∈ [01] such that the convex
combination v :=∑ni=1 αivi is collinear with u¯. Then the difference between v and u¯ can
be compensated with a larger regret parameter K′. Specifically, we can select a K′ such
that K′‖v‖ ≥ K‖u¯‖. As a further difficulty, if we only replace u¯ as described above, then
φ′, i.e., the mean of the new probability measure, will not be collinear with φ. However,
depending on the structure of the support of μ, we can restore the equality of φ′ and φ
by repeating the replacement process for other points in the support of μ, in addition to
the given point u¯. Following these steps, we can obtain a new representation (μ′K′ a)
that is more choice overload prone than the original representation.
Finally, if μ({uφ}) > 0, it is possible to obtain a more choice overload prone represen-
tation also by transferring some mass from the regret-free state uφ to other states in U .
This process is less demanding because, unlike all other states, we do not have to worry
about the possibility of decreasing the ex post regret at the state uφ. Hence, this method
does not necessitate increasing the parameter K to obtain a more choice overload prone
representation. Moreover, unlike the previous method, a mass transfer from uφ to suit-
ably selected states in U would induce a φ′ that is collinear with the original mean φ,
even if we do not reduce the mass of any other point in the support of μ. However, with
this method we cannot retain the condition φ′ = φ. Thus, the parameter a should be
replaced with a′ := αa, where α ∈ (01) is the number with φ′ = αφ, so that the new rep-
resentation displays the same behavior as the original representation whenever there is
only one ordinary alternative.15
For further details and examples on the role of beliefs in comparative statics, we refer
the reader to Buturak and Evren (2015).
Appendix B: An auxiliary representation
In this appendix, we prove the following auxiliary representation, which acts as our main
tool in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 0. A choice correspondence c onX satisfies the axioms A1, A3(i), A3(ii), A4, and
A6 if and only if there exist continuous and affine functionsϕ : →R andW :X →R such
that:
(i) For every x ∈X and p′ ∈ x,
p′ ∈ c(x) ⇔ ϕ(p′)=max
p∈x ϕ(p)≥W (x)
 ∈ c(x) ⇔ max
p∈x ϕ(p)≤W (x)
(10)
(ii) For some p∗p∗ ∈ , ϕ(p∗) >W ({p∗}) and ϕ(p∗) <W ({p∗}).
15If one wishes, it is possible to restore the condition φ′ =φ by suitably adjusting K.
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Here, the function ϕ is a standard expected utility function that represents the DM’s
ranking of ordinary alternatives. The term W (x) is a threshold level that varies with
the choice set x and allows the representation to accommodate a context dependent
attitude toward the default option. The key feature of this representation is that, given a
choice set x, the DM opts for an ordinary alternative as opposed to the default option if
and only if maxp∈x ϕ(p) exceeds W (x).
To relate Theorem 0 to Theorem 1, set (x) := maxx ϕ − W (x) for every x ∈ X , and
denote by the preference relation on  represented by ϕ. Then expression (10) implies
(2), while the latter expression plays a key role in the proof of Theorem 1, as we noted in
Section 3.
It is worth noting that Theorem 0 might also prove useful in alternative models that
depict different forms of context dependence because it dispenses with asymmetric al-
pha and part (iii) of the independence axiom.
Proof of Theorem 0. We omit the “if” part of the proof, which is a routine exercise.
For the “only if” part, let c be a choice correspondence on X that satisfies the axioms A1,
A3(i), A3(ii), A4, and A6.
Fix a pair of ordinary alternatives p∗p∗ such that c({p∗}) = {p∗} and c({p∗}) = {},
as in the nontriviality axiom. Put X ∗ := {x ∈X : c(x)⊆ } and X∗ := {x ∈X : c(x)= {}}.
Claim 1. The sets X ∗ and X∗ are relatively open in X .
Proof. Part (ii) of the continuity axiom implies that {x ∈X : ∈ c(x)} is a closed subset
of X . Hence, {x ∈ X : c(x) ⊆ } is open. Using compactness of  and part (i) of the
continuity axiom, it can easily be verified that {x ∈X : c(x)∩ =∅} is also closed, which
implies that {x ∈X : c(x)= {}} is open. 
Since X ∗ is an open subset of X , clearly, there exists a number α∗ ∈ (01) such that
α∗x + (1 − α∗){p∗} ∈ X ∗ for every x ∈ X . Define a binary relation  on  as, for every
pq ∈ ,
p q ⇔ α∗p+ (1− α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗{pq} + (1− α∗){p∗})
Note that the relation is complete by definitions. We now show that is transitive.
Take any pq r ∈  with p q and q r. Then
α∗p+ (1− α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗{pq} + (1− α∗){p∗}) (11)
α∗q+ (1− α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗{q r} + (1− α∗){p∗}) (12)
Put x˜ := α∗{pq r} + (1 − α∗){p∗} and z˜ := {η ∈ {pq r} : α∗η + (1 − α∗)p∗ ∈ c(x˜)}. Ob-
serve that if p ∈ z˜, which means α∗p + (1 − α∗)p∗ ∈ c(x˜), then c(x˜) ∩ (α∗{p r} + (1 −
α∗){p∗}) =∅, and exclusive WARP implies α∗p+ (1− α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗{p r} + (1− α∗){p∗}).
Similarly, if q ∈ z˜, then c(x˜)∩ (α∗{pq}+ (1−α∗){p∗}) =∅. Hence, in this case, from (11)
and exclusive WARP it follows that p ∈ z˜. Analogously, r ∈ z˜ implies q ∈ z˜, as a result of
(12). Moreover, z˜ is nonempty by construction. It follows that p ∈ z˜ in all contingencies
and, hence, p r.
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Let us now show that satisfies the classical independence axiom. Pick any pq r ∈
 and γ ∈ (01). Suppose p  q, meaning that p′ := α∗p + (1 − α∗)p∗ belongs to c(x′),
where x′ := α∗{pq} + (1− α∗){p∗}. Set r′ := α∗r + (1− α∗)p∗. Observe that
γx′ + (1− γ){r ′}= α∗{γp+ (1− γ)rγq+ (1− γ)r}+ (1− α∗){p∗} (13)
Similarly,
γp′ + (1− γ)r ′ = α∗(γp+ (1− γ)r)+ (1− α∗)p∗ (14)
Moreover, independence axiom A3(i) implies γp′ + (1−γ)r ′ ∈ c(γx′ + (1−γ){r ′}). By (13)
and (14), this simply means γp+ (1− γ)r  γq+ (1− γ)r, as we sought.
To verify continuity of , let (pn) (qn) be convergent sequences in  such that
α∗pn + (1 − α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗{pnqn} + (1 − α∗){p∗}) for every n. Then, from the continuity
axiom, it readily follows that α∗ limpn + (1− α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗{limpn limqn} + (1−α∗){p∗}).
Hence, limpn  limqn if pn  qn for every n. This proves that  is also continuous.
By the properties of that we have established, there exists an expected utility func-
tion ϕ : →R that represents . Next, we prove that ϕ also represents the restriction of
c to .
Claim 2. If c(x)∩ =∅, then c(x)∩= argmaxx ϕ.
Proof. Let x ∈ X and p′ ∈ c(x) ∩ . Then independence axiom A3(i) yields α∗p′ + (1−
α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗x+ (1 − α∗){p∗}). From the definition of α∗ and exclusive WARP, it follows
that α∗p′ +(1−α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗{p′ q}+(1−α∗){p∗}) for every q ∈ x. That is, p′ ∈ argmaxx ϕ.
Thus, c(x)∩⊆ argmaxx ϕ for every x ∈X .
To establish the converse inclusion, pick any x ∈ X and p ∈ argmaxx ϕ. Recall that
c(α∗x+ (1− α∗){p∗})⊆ . Pick any q ∈ x with α∗q+ (1− α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗x+ (1− α∗){p∗}).
Then c(α∗x+ (1−α∗){p∗})∩ (α∗{pq}+ (1−α∗){p∗}) =∅. Moreover, α∗p+ (1−α∗)p∗ ∈
c(α∗{pq} + (1 − α∗){p∗}) by definitions of p and ϕ. Hence, exclusive WARP implies
α∗p + (1 − α∗)p∗ ∈ c(α∗x + (1 − α∗){p∗}). Finally, from independence axiom A3(i), it
follows that p ∈ c(x) provided that c(x)∩ =∅. 
The next claim proves useful in the derivation of the function W .
Claim 3. (i) If c(x) ∩  = ∅ and c({p}) = {p}, then c(αx+ (1 − α){p}) ⊆  for every α ∈
(01).
(ii) If  ∈ c(x)∩ c(y), then  ∈ c(αx+ (1− α)y) for every α ∈ (01).
Proof. We start with the proof of (i). Pick any x ∈ X and p ∈  such that c(x) ∩  = ∅
and c({p}) = {p}. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an α ∈ (01) such that  ∈
c(αx+ (1− α){p}). Set z := αx+ (1− α){p}. Observe that γz + (1− γ){p∗} = γαx+ (1−
γα){pγ} for any γ ∈ (01), where
pγ := γ(1− α)1− γα p+
1− γ
1− γαp∗
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It is also clear that limγ→1pγ = p. Thus, by Claim 1, c(pγ)= {pγ} for all sufficiently large
γ ∈ (01). From independence axiom A3(i), it follows that c(γαx+ (1−γα){pγ})∩ =∅
for any such γ. Moreover, independence axiom A3(ii) implies c(γz + (1− γ){p∗})= {}
for any γ ∈ (01), which is a contradiction.
To prove (ii), let x y ∈ X be such that  ∈ c(x) ∩ c(y). Fix any αγ ∈ (01) and put
xγ := γx + (1 − γ){p∗}. Then independence axiom A3(ii) implies c(xγ) = {}. Thus, by
applying the same axiom to the sets xγ and y, we also see that c(αxγ + (1 − α)y) = {}.
Since γ is an arbitrary number in (01), from the continuity axiom it follows that  ∈
c(limγ→1 αxγ + (1− α)y)= c(αx+ (1− α)y), as we sought. 
Claim 4. There exists a continuous and affine function W : X → R such that for every
x ∈X ,
c(x)∩ =∅ ⇔ max
x
ϕ≥W (x)
 ∈ c(x) ⇔ max
x
ϕ≤W (x)
(15)
Proof. Fix an x ∈ X∗. By Claim 1, the sets {λ ∈ [01] : c(λx + (1 − λ){p∗}) = {}} and
{λ ∈ [01] : c(λx + (1 − λ){p∗}) ⊆ } are relatively open in [01]. Since both of the for-
mer sets are also disjoint and nonempty, their union cannot be equal to the connected
set [01]. That is, there exists a λ ∈ (01) such that  ∈ c(λx + (1 − λ){p∗}) = {}. In
fact, this number, which we denote by λ∗(x), is the unique number in [01] that satisfies
the latter two properties. Indeed, for any λ > λ∗(x), the set λ∗(x)x + (1 − λ∗(x)){p∗}
can be expressed as a convex combination of λx + (1 − λ){p∗} and {p∗}. Thus, if
c(λx + (1 − λ){p∗}) ∩  were nonempty for some λ ∈ (λ∗(x)1], Claim 3(i) would im-
ply c(λ∗(x)x + (1 − λ∗(x)){p∗}) ⊆ , which contradicts the definition of λ∗(x). Hence,
c(λx+ (1−λ){p∗})= {} for λ > λ∗(x). Similarly, λ < λ∗(x) implies c(λx+ (1−λ){p∗})⊆
 by Claim 3(i).
Let us now show that λ∗(·) is continuous on X∗. Pick a sequence (xn) in X∗ that con-
verges to some x ∈ X∗. It suffices to find a subsequence (xnk) such that limk λ∗(xnk) =
λ∗(x). For each n, put λ∗n := λ∗(xn) and zn := λ∗nxn + (1− λ∗n){p∗}. Then  ∈ c(zn) = {}
for every n. In particular, we can pick a sequence of ordinary alternatives (qn) such that
qn ∈ c(zn) for every n. Since [01] ×  is compact, there exists a subsequence (λ∗nkqnk)
that converges to some (λq) ∈ [01] ×, which also implies limk znk = λx+ (1−λ){p∗}.
From the continuity axiom, it then follows that q and  both belong to c(λx + (1 −
λ){p∗}). Hence, λ satisfies the defining properties of the unique number λ∗(x), implying
that λ= λ∗(x).
Since λ∗(x) ∈ (01) for every x ∈ X∗, we can define a function h : X∗ → R as h(x) :=
1/λ∗(x). The next step is to show that h is affine on X∗. Let x y ∈X∗ and γ ∈ (01). Note
that γx+ (1− γ)y also belongs to X∗ by independence axiom A3(ii). Put
τ := λ
∗(y)γ
λ∗(y)γ + λ∗(x)(1− γ)
so that
γ = τλ
∗(x)
τλ∗(x)+ (1− τ)λ∗(y) and 1− γ =
(1− τ)λ∗(y)
τλ∗(x)+ (1− τ)λ∗(y) 
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Then
τ
(
λ∗(x)x+ (1− λ∗(x)){p∗})+ (1− τ)(λ∗(y)y + (1− λ∗(y)){p∗})
= (τλ∗(x)+ (1− τ)λ∗(y))( τλ∗(x)
τλ∗(x)+ (1− τ)λ∗(y)x+
(1− τ)λ∗(y)
τλ∗(x)+ (1− τ)λ∗(y)y
)
+ (1− (τλ∗(x)+ (1− τ)λ∗(y))){p∗}
= (τλ∗(x)+ (1− τ)λ∗(y))(γx+ (1− γ)y)+ (1− (τλ∗(x)+ (1− τ)λ∗(y))){p∗}
Moreover, Claim 3(ii) and independence axiom A3(i) jointly imply
 ∈ c(τ(λ∗(x)x+ (1− λ∗(x)){p∗})+ (1− τ)(λ∗(y)y + (1− λ∗(y)){p∗})) = {}
It follows that λ∗(γx + (1 − γ)y) = τλ∗(x) + (1 − τ)λ∗(y), i.e., h(γx + (1 − γ)y) =
(τλ∗(x) + (1 − τ)λ∗(y))−1. Since the latter number equals both θ := γ/(τλ∗(x)) and
θ′ := (1 − γ)/((1 − τ)λ∗(y)), we see that h(γx + (1 − γ)y) = τθ + (1 − τ)θ′ = γ/λ∗(x) +
(1− γ)/λ∗(y)= γh(x)+ (1− γ)h(y), as we sought.
To extend the function h toX , pick a number γ∗ ∈ (01) such that γ∗x+(1−γ∗){p∗} ∈
X∗ for every x ∈X . (The existence of such a γ∗ is guaranteed by Claim 1.) For every x ∈X ,
set
h1(x) :=
h
(
γ∗x+ (1− γ∗){p∗}
)− (1− γ∗)h({p∗})
γ∗

Observe that by affinity of h, we have h1(x)= h(x) for every x ∈ X∗. Moreover, the func-
tion h1 is continuous and affine onX by the corresponding properties of the maps h and
x→ γ∗x+ (1− γ∗){p∗} on X∗ and X , respectively.
Now, fix a number β> 0 and set, for each x ∈X ,
W (x) :=max
x
ϕ+β(h1(x)− 1)
Then W (x) is a continuous and affine function of x ∈X by the corresponding properties
of maxx ϕ and h1(x).
Pick any x ∈ X . To verify (15), it suffices to establish the following three properties:
(i) h1(x) > 1 if x ∈X∗, (ii) h1(x)= 1 if  ∈ c(x) = {}, and (iii) h1(x) < 1 if x ∈X ∗.
Since h1 = h on X∗, property (i) immediately follows from the definitions. To prove
(ii), suppose  ∈ c(x) = {}. Let (γn) be a sequence in (01) that converges to 1 and
put xn := γnx+ (1− γn){p∗} for each n. Observe that by the independence axiom A3(ii),
xn ∈X∗ for every n. We claim
lim
n
λ∗(xn)= 1 (16)
Otherwise, there exist an ε ∈ (01) and a subsequence (nk) such that λ∗nk := λ∗(xnk) ≤
1 − ε for each k. By passing to a further subsequence if necessary, we can assume that
(λ∗nk) converges to some λ ∈ [01 − ε]. Then the continuity axiom and the definition of
λ∗(·) imply  ∈ c(limk λ∗nkxnk + (1 − λ∗nk){p∗}) = c(λx + (1 − λ){p∗}). This contradicts
Claim 3(i) and proves (16).
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By definitions and affinity of h1, we then see that h1(x) = limn γnh1(x) + (1 −
γn)h1({p∗})= limn h1(xn)= limn h(xn)= limn 1/λ∗(xn)= 1. This proves (ii).
Finally, to prove (iii), suppose that c(x) ⊆ . Following an argument that we used
when defining the function λ∗(·), there exists a γ ∈ (01) such that  ∈ c(γ{p∗} + (1 −
γ)x) = {}. Observe that h1({p∗}) > 1 while h1(γ{p∗} + (1 − γ)x) = 1 by properties (i)
and (ii), respectively. Since h1 is an affine function, it follows that 1 = γh1({p∗}) + (1 −
γ)h1(x) > γ + (1− γ)h1(x), implying that 1>h1(x). 
It is easy to check that Claims 2 and 4 complete the proof of Theorem 0. 
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 1
For the “if” part of Theorem 1, it suffices to show that a choice correspondence that ad-
mits an AR representation must satisfy L-continuity—the necessity of all other axioms is
fairly obvious. Given an AR representation (μKa), we denote by  the corresponding
net expected utility function. That is, for every x ∈X and p ∈ x,
(px) :=
∫
U
(
u(p)−K
(
max
q∈x u(q)− u(p)
))
μ(du) (17)
Furthermore, whenever φ is nonzero as an element of RB0 , we set uφ := φ/‖φ‖ as in
Appendix A.
Claim 5. Let c be a choice correspondence on X that admits an AR representation
(μKa). Then c satisfies the L-continuity axiom.
Proof. Recall that an affine function on X is Lipschitz continuous if and only if it is a
positive affine transformation of a function of the form x→ ∫U maxx uη(du) for a (finite)
signed measure η on U (Dekel et al. 2007, Supplementary Material).
Set (x) := maxp∈x (px) − a for x ∈ X , so that  ∈ c(x) if and only if (x) ≤ 0.
Note that maxp∈x (px) =
∫
U maxx uη(du), where η := (1 + K)‖φ‖δuφ − Kμ if φ = 0
and η := −Kμ if φ = 0. Thus,  is Lipschitz continuous on X . That is, there exists a
number m¯ > 0 such that (x)−(y)≤ m¯dH(x y) for every x y ∈X .
If  is constant over X , then either  ∈ c(x) for every x ∈ X or  /∈ c(x) for every x ∈
X . Hence, in this case, the conclusion of L-continuity holds trivially for any y∗ y∗ ∈X .
Suppose now that  is not constant, so that (y∗) > (y∗) for some y∗ y∗ ∈ X . Set
m := m¯/((y∗)−(y∗)). Then (x)−(y)≤m((y∗)−(y∗))dH(x y) for every x y ∈
X . In particular, dH(x y)≤ α/m implies (x)−(y)≤ ((y∗)−(y∗))α/(1−α) for any
α ∈ (01) and x y ∈ X . Since  is an affine function, the latter inequality simply means
(αy∗ + (1 − α)x) ≤ (αy∗ + (1 − α)y). It follows that  ∈ c(αy∗ + (1 − α)y) implies
 ∈ c(αy∗ + (1 − α)x) for any α ∈ (01) and x y ∈ X with dH(x y) ≤ α/m, as demanded
by L-continuity. 
To prove the “only if” part of Theorem 1, let c be a choice correspondence on X that
satisfies the axioms A1–A6. Define the points p∗p∗ and the functions ϕW as in the
proof of Theorem 0.
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For every x ∈X , set
(x) :=max
x
ϕ−W (x)
By Claim 4, for any x ∈ X , we have  ∈ c(x) if and only if (x)≤ 0, while c(x) ∩  = ∅ if
and only if (x) ≥ 0. In particular, ({p∗}) > 0>({p∗}) and the function p → ({p})
is not constant over .
We next show that the functions ϕ(p) and ({p}) induce the same preference rela-
tion over .
Claim 6. For any pq ∈ , we have ϕ(p)≥ ϕ(q) if and only if ({p})≥({q}).
Proof. Let us write (p) and c(p) in place of ({p}) and c({p}), respectively. As noted
earlier, the function (p) is not constant over . Thus, clearly, it suffices to show that
ϕ(p)≥ ϕ(q) implies (p)≥(q).
Pick any pq ∈  with ϕ(p) ≥ ϕ(q). Set p′ := α∗p+ (1 − α∗)p∗ and q′ := α∗q + (1 −
α∗)p∗. Note that ϕ(p)≥ ϕ(q) simply means p′ ∈ c({p′ q′}). Moreover, we have (q′) > 0
by definition of α∗. Let γ ∈ (01) be the number such that (γq′ + (1−γ)p∗)= 0, so that
c(γq′ +(1−γ)p∗)∩ =∅. Then, independence axiom A3(iii) implies c(γp′ +(1−γ)p∗)∩
 =∅, i.e., (γp′ +(1−γ)p∗)≥ 0. It follows that (γp′ +(1−γ)p∗)≥(γq′ +(1−γ)p∗).
Since  is affine and α∗γ > 0, we conclude that (p)≥(q), as we sought. 
Now, let us define a binary relation ∗ on X as, for every x y ∈X ,
x∗ y ⇔ (x)≥(y)
The next claim shows that ∗ satisfies all axioms demanded by Sarver’s (2008) rep-
resentation theorem.
Claim 7. The relation ∗ is complete, transitive and satisfies the following additional
properties:
(i) If x ∗ y ∗ z, then there exist αα′ ∈ (01) such that αx + (1 − α)z ∗ y ∗ α′x +
(1− α′)z.
(ii) If x∗ y, then αx+ (1− α)z ∗ αy + (1− α)z for every z ∈X and α ∈ (01].
(iii) If {p}∗ {q} and p ∈ x, then x∗ x∪ {q}.
(iv) There exist y∗ y∗ ∈X andanumberm> 0 such thatαy∗+(1−α)y ∗ αy∗+(1−α)x
for every α ∈ (01) and x y ∈X with dH(x y)≤ α/m.
Proof. We only prove (iii) and (iv); the remaining claims are well known implications
of the fact that  is a real valued, affine function on X .
To prove (iii), pick any pq ∈  and x ∈ X such that {p} ∗ {q} and p ∈ x. Then
Claim 6 and the definition of ∗ imply ϕ(p) ≥ ϕ(q). Pick r ∈ {p∗p∗} and α ∈ (01]
such that (α(x ∪ {q}) + (1 − α){r}) = 0. Put y := αx + (1 − α){r} and observe that
y ∪ {αq + (1 − α)r} = α(x ∪ {q}) + (1 − α){r}. Hence, (y ∪ {αq + (1 − α)r}) = 0, which
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implies c(y ∪{αq+ (1−α)r})∩ =∅. Moreover, since ϕ(p)≥ ϕ(q) and αp+ (1−α)r ∈ y,
there exists a p′ ∈ y such that ϕ(p′) ≥ ϕ(q′) for every q′ ∈ y ∪ {αq + (1 − α)r}. Then
p′ ∈ c(y∪{αq+(1−α)r}) by Claim 2, while asymmetric alpha implies p′ ∈ c(y). In partic-
ular, c(y)∩ =∅ and, hence, (y) :=(αx+ (1−α){r})≥ 0=(α(x∪{q})+ (1−α){r}).
As in the last argument of Claim 6, this simply means (x)≥(x∪{q}), i.e., x∗ x∪{q}.
This proves (iii).
For the proof of (iv), let y∗ y∗ ∈ X and m > 0 be as posited by the L-continuity ax-
iom. Pick any x y ∈ X and α ∈ (01) such that dH(x y) ≤ α/m. It remains to show that
(αy∗ + (1− α)y)≥(αy∗ + (1− α)x).
Put z∗ := αy∗ + (1 − α)y and z∗ := αy∗ + (1 − α)x. Let r ∈ {p∗p∗} and γ ∈ (01] be
such that (γz∗ + (1− γ){r})= 0. Set
α′ := γα y ′ := γ(1− α)
1− γα y +
1− γ
1− γα {r}, and x
′ := γ(1− α)
1− γα x+
1− γ
1− γα {r}
Observe that γz∗ + (1−γ){r} = α′y∗ + (1−α′)y ′, while γz∗ + (1−γ){r} = α′y∗ + (1−α′)x′.
It is also easy to check that
dH(x
′ y ′)= γ(1− α)
1− γα dH(x y)≤
γ(1− α)
1− γα
α
m
≤ α
′
m

Moreover, by construction,  belongs to c(α′y∗ + (1 − α′)y ′). Thus, the L-continuity
axiom implies that  also belongs to c(α′y∗ + (1 − α′)x′). In turn, this is equivalent to
saying that 0≥(γz∗ + (1− γ){r}). Thus, (z∗)≥(z∗) by a usual argument. 
From Claim 7 it follows that Sarver’s (2008) representation theorem applies to the
binary relation ∗. That is, there exists a probability measure μ on U and a number
K ≥ 0 such that for every x y ∈X ,
x∗ y ⇔ max
p∈x (px)≥maxp∈y (py)
where (px) is defined as in (17).
Since the function x → maxp∈x (px) is continuous on X , the binary relation ∗
is continuous in a standard, topological sense. Proposition 2 of Dekel et al. (2001)
shows that an affine functional that represents a continuous binary relation on X is
unique up to positive affine transformations. Thus, there exist α > 0 and γ ∈ R such
that (x)= αmaxp∈x (px)+ γ for every x ∈ X . In particular, (x)≥ (≤) 0 if and only
if maxp∈x (px)≥ (≤)− γ/α. Hence, if we let a := −γ/α, it follows that for every x ∈X ,
c(x)∩ =∅ ⇔ max
p∈x (px)≥ a
 ∈ c(x) ⇔ max
p∈x (px)≤ a
(18)
We next show that
c(x)∩ =∅ ⇒ c(x)∩= argmax
p∈x (px) (19)
1052 Buturak and Evren Theoretical Economics 12 (2017)
First observe that by Claim 6 and the definitions, the function p→(p {p}) represents
the same preference relation on  as the function ϕ. Moreover, it is easily verified that
(px) = (1 +K)(p {p})−K ∫U maxx u μ(du) for every p ∈  and x ∈ X . By combin-
ing these two observations, we see that argmaxp∈x (px) = argmaxx ϕ for every x ∈ X .
Thus, (19) follows from Claim 2.
Finally, note that (18) and (19) are jointly equivalent to statements (i) and (ii) in Def-
inition 1. Thus, we have shown that (μKa) is an AR representation for c, which com-
pletes the proof of Theorem 1.
Appendix D: Proofs of Propositions 1–3
Note that for any AR representation (μKa) and any x ∈X , we have
max
p∈x (px)=maxp∈x
∫
U
(
u(p)−K
(
max
x
u− u(p)
))
μ(du)
=max
p∈x
∫
U
u(p)μ(du)−K
(∫
U
max
x
uμ(du)−max
p∈x
∫
U
u(p)μ(du)
)
=max
x
φ−K
(∫
U
max
x
uμ(du)−max
x
φ
)

Here, the second equality is a consequence of the additivity of the expectation operator,
whereas the first and third equalities follow from the definitions of  and φ, respec-
tively. To simplify our notation, let us set R(x) := K(∫U maxx uμ(du) − maxx φ), which
also equals K
∫
U (maxx u− u(p¯))μ(du) for any p¯ ∈ argmaxx φ and x ∈ X . It then follows
that
max
p∈x (px)=maxx φ−R(x) ∀x ∈X 
It is also worth noting thatR({p})= 0 for every p ∈ . Thus, the choice correspondence
c represented by (μKa) exhibits choice overload at some x ∈X if and only if
max
p∈x (px) < a≤maxx φ (20)
In what follows, ◦ stands for the interior of . That is, ◦ := {p ∈  : pb > 0 ∀b ∈ B}.
Lemma 1. Let (μKa) be a nontrivial AR representation for c. Assume further thatK > 0
and the support of μ contains at least two distinct points. Then there exists a p¯ ∈ ◦ with
φ(p¯) = a. Moreover, any neighborhood of {p¯} contains a set x ∈ X such that c exhibits
choice overload at x.
Proof. Let p∗ and p∗ be as in the nontriviality axiom so that φ(p∗) < a < φ(p∗). Since
◦ is a dense subset of , without loss of generality we can assume p∗ ∈ ◦ by the first
part of the continuity axiom. Clearly, there exists an α ∈ (01) with φ(αp∗ + (1−α)p∗)=
a. Since α> 0, it is also clear that p¯ := αp∗ + (1− α)p∗ belongs to ◦ as well.
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By assumption, the support of μ contains a point u¯ that is distinct from uφ. Since u¯
and uφ represent distinct preferences on , there exist qq′ ∈  such that
u¯
(
q− q′)> 0≥ uφ(q− q′)
As p¯ belongs to ◦, there exists an ε > 0 such that xβ := {p¯ p¯ + β(q − q′)} ⊆  for
every β ∈ (0 ε]. Observe that φ(p¯) ≥ φ(p¯ + β(q − q′)) because φ and uφ represent
the same preference on . Thus, maxr∈xβ (rxβ) = φ(p¯) − R(xβ), while R(xβ) =
K
∫
U (maxxβ u − u(p¯))μ(du). Furthermore, u¯(p¯ + β(q − q′)) > u¯(p¯), implying that the
function u → maxxβ u − u(p¯) attains a strictly positive value at u¯. Since u¯ belongs to
the support of μ, and u→maxxβ u− u(p¯) is continuous and nonnegative, it follows that∫
U (maxxβ u − u(p¯))μ(du) > 0. Then R(xβ) > 0 because K > 0. Moreover, R(xβ) > 0
implies φ(p¯) >maxr∈xβ (rxβ) by definition. As φ(p¯) = a, we can then conclude that
c exhibits choice overload at xβ. This completes the proof because β is an arbitrary
number in (0 ε], and limβ→0 xβ = {p¯}. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The “if” part of the proposition follows from Lemma 1 im-
mediately. For the “only if” part, note that if K = 0 or the support of μ consists of a single
point, then R(x) = 0 for every x ∈ X . This, in turn, implies maxp∈x (px) = maxx φ,
which rules out instances of the form (20). 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let (μKa) and (μ′K′ a′) be strictly nontrivial AR repre-
sentations for c and c′, respectively, and assume μ= μ′.
Suppose c′ is more choice overload prone than c. Let p¯, ε, and xβ be as in the proof
of Lemma 1, so that c exhibits choice overload at xβ for every β ∈ (0 ε]. Then c′ must
also do so, which means that for every β ∈ (0 ε],
max
r∈xβ
′
(
rxβ
)
< a′ ≤max
xβ
φ′ (21)
Observe that maxr∈xβ ′(rxβ) converges to ′(p¯ {p¯})=φ′(p¯) as β→ 0 because xβ con-
verges to {p¯}. Similarly, maxxβ φ′ also converges to φ′(p¯). Hence, in (21), passing to the
limit as β→ 0 yields φ′(p¯)= a′. Moreover, μ= μ′ implies φ(p¯)=φ′(p¯), while φ(p¯)= a
by definition of p¯. So a= a′, as we sought.
It remains to show that K ≤ K′. Fix any β ∈ (0 ε], and recall that R(xβ) > 0. To
simplify our notation, let us write x in place of xβ. By contradiction, suppose K > K′.
With μ= μ′, this implies
R(x)=K
∫
U
(
max
x
u− u(p¯)
)
μ(du) >K′
∫
U
(
max
x
u− u(p¯)
)
μ(du)=R′(x)
Following usual arguments, let  ∈ c′(γx + (1 − γ){p˜}) = {} for some γ ∈ (01] and
p˜ ∈ . Set xγ := γx + (1 − γ){p˜}. Observe that R(xγ) = γR(x) because R is an affine
function and R({p˜}) = 0. Similarly, R′(xγ) = γR′(x). Thus, R(x) > R′(x) implies
R(xγ) > R
′(xγ). Also, maxxγ φ′ = R′(xγ) + a′ by definition of xγ . Hence, with a = a′
and φ=φ′, we see that
R(xγ)+ a >R′(xγ)+ a′ =max
xγ
φ (22)
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Moreover, since R′(xγ) ≥ 0, the equality in (22) also entails maxxγ φ ≥ a′ = a. It fol-
lows that maxxγ φ ≥ a > maxxγ φ − R(xγ) = maxr∈xγ (rx), which means that c ex-
hibits choice overload at xγ . However, c′ does not exhibit choice overload at xγ because
c′(xγ) = {} by definitions. This proves the “only if” part of the proposition.
For the “if” part, note thatK′ ≥K and μ′ = μ imply maxp∈x ′(px)≤maxp∈x (px)
for every x ∈ X . If, in addition, a′ is equal to a, from the characterization (20) it easily
follows that c′ is more choice overload prone than c because φ′ is equal to φ as well. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let (μKa) and (μ′K′ a′) be nontrivial AR represen-
tations for c and c′, respectively. Assume further that μ = μ′ and K = K′. Then
maxp∈x (px) = maxp∈x ′(px) for every x ∈ X . Recall that c(x) = {} if and only if
maxp∈x (px) < a, and similarly, c′(x) = {} if and only if maxp∈x ′(px) < a′. Hence,
clearly, if a≤ a′, then c(x)= {} implies c′(x)= {} for every x ∈X .
Conversely, suppose c(x) = {} implies c′(x) = {}. Since c satisfies the nontrivi-
ality axiom, we can find a convergent sequence (pn) in  such that c({pn}) = {} for
every n and  ∈ c({limpn}) = {}. By the latter condition, we have φ(p) = a, where
p := limpn. Moreover, c({pn}) = {} implies c′({pn}) = {}, which means φ′(pn) < a′.
Thus, limφ′(pn)≤ a′, whereas limφ′(pn)= limφ(pn)=φ(p)= a. So a≤ a′. 
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